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

ARMY EXECUTIVE IRREGULAR WARFARE CONFERENCE CHARTS ARMY'S PATH

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

ON THE COVER
The triangle represents the Clausewitzian trinity of the three forces that drive the nature of a war — passion, reason and chance. Passion is most often associated with the people, reason with the government and chance with the military. In IW, the roles of passion and the people are much more important than in traditional warfare, thus the nontraditional positioning of the triangle, with the people on top.

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SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).

Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all contributions. *Special Warfare* will attempt to afford authors an opportunity to review the final edited version; requests for changes must be received by the given deadline.

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One of the items to come out of the Army's Executive Irregular Warfare Executive Conference at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Aug. 10-14, is the recognition of the need for developing a versatile mix of civilian and military organizations that can respond to an environment of varying but persistent conflict. During the conference, General George Casey, chief of staff of the Army, told the audience that the Army needs to develop Soldiers for full-spectrum operations, that part of that solution is the development of a unique education program designed to create adaptable leaders, and that the Army requires a center of excellence for IW.

During the conference, senior leaders and experts identified issues and concerns involved with training the force for IW. Later, attendees formed six working groups that sought to answer the questions and recommend solutions for the issues. The working group charged with developing ideas for individual and small-unit training concluded that leader training needs to emphasize initiative, confidence, accountability and problem-solving, and it recommended applying those measures to all aspects of training for individuals and units.

That conclusion comes as no surprise to those of us involved in the training of Special Forces. For the last 20 years, SF has assessed candidates for many of those same traits, and we are planning to apply assessment-and-selection standards for Soldiers training for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, as well. Once candidates have been assessed, our training is designed to complement and hone their natural qualities by providing training in the skills requisite for Army special-operations warriors.

The complexity of training such as the Robin Sage culmination exercise in the SF Qualification Course, the Soldiers' Urban Reaction Facility used to train Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers, and training activities in the SWCS NCO Academy and Warrant Officer Institute place a high demand on Soldiers' initiative, adaptability and problem-solving skills.

Also valuable is the training that we give our SF candidates in combatives. Throughout history, training in combatives has been important for giving Soldiers confidence, strength and a warrior mindset. By subjecting them to the stress and physical exhaustion of hand-to-hand combat, the training prepares them for the shock of battle so that they will not hesitate in extreme situations.

In recent years the Army has developed the Modern Army Combatives Program to give Soldiers a baseline introduction to martial-arts training, but MACP still does not address the environments in which special-operations Soldiers often operate. Our Special Operations Combatives Program adds SF-centric tasks to those already taught in the MACP. It is currently being taught in some of the committees at SWCS, and we are still working to standardize the instruction.

Another working group from the IW conference recommended the establishment of an IW center, the integration of civil and military activities across the IW spectrum and an increased number of regionally focused and culturally attuned personnel. Those IW capabilities sound similar to those that we try to confer and enhance through our training in CA, PSYOP and SF; to our activities dedicated to providing training in language and culture; and to our efforts since the 1960s to explore intellectual concepts and provide analysis.

Whether or not the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is designated as the IW center of excellence, our history of training Soldiers involved in many of the aspects of IW give us a base of knowledge that can guide the Army's IW efforts and will allow us to make a significant contribution to the preparation of the combination of forces involved in IW.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

10TH SF GROUP SOLDIER RECEIVES FREDERICK AWARD

The Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick Award is presented annually to one American Special Forces Soldier who exhibits the highest degree of professionalism and continues the tradition that the original members of the First Special Service Force set during World War II.

Sergeant First Class James L. Cannon, a member of Operational Detachment Alpha-0112, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group, based in Stuttgart, Germany, was honored at this year's presentation.

Cannon distinguished himself as the senior weapons sergeant for his detachment during a deployment in support of the International Security and Assistance Force in the Kapisa Province of Afghanistan.

Cannon and his detachment conducted 192 days of continuous combat operations in one of the most hostile locations in Afghanistan. Throughout the deployment, Cannon was notable for his exceptional leadership, courage under fire and warrior spirit. In conjunction with the Frederick Award, he was awarded two Bronze Star Medals, one with the Valor device. Cannon was acknowledged as the consummate Special Forces Soldier, whose actions personify the combat adviser. — *10th Special Forces Group PAO*

Evolution of the Lessons Learned Program

Over the last several months, the United States Army Special Operations Command's lessons-learned program has evolved to focus less on archiving information and more on analyzing it to resolve issues and provide feedback to Soldiers at all operational levels.

Initially, USASOC's emphasis on lessons learned focused on educating users about the program and capturing observations, insights and lessons, or OILs, in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System. (Those lessons are available on SIPR at http://www.jllis.smil.mil/ussocom/.) Now the focus has evolved to using those OILs to identify trends and issues that can be resolved through a review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities, or DOTMLPF, and to bring timely solutions to the force.

USASOC's Lessons Learned Fusion Cell was established to collect and integrate multiple-source information gained through operations, exercises, experiments and training events. The fusion cell's goal is to share that information rapidly among warfighters, support the resolution of DOTMLPF issues and provide responsive feedback for units to implement. Unit analysts, or UAs, are located in each of USASOC's subordinate commands and their subordinate units. The UAs serve both as the unit's connection to the fusion cell and as the commander's lessons-learned subject-matter experts and analysts.

A key component of resolving issues is the Lessons Learned Working Group, or LLWG, which meets monthly to review the prioritized issue list developed by the fusion cell with input from the UAs. The outcome of the LLWG review is the assignment of DOTMLPF issues to the appropriate USASOC staff section for resolution. Some issues being staffed are: the synchronization of pre-mobilization training; the serviceability of the combat-application tourniquet; multi-mode band jammers; the inadequacy of infrared lights and trailer compatibility issues on the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle; the requirements for lightweight indirect-fire systems; and the increased mobility provided by motorcycles.

The fusion cell functions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the operational and tactical levels, the fusion cell focuses on issues that directly affect warfighters. The projected addition of a UA to support the JFK Special Warfare Center will provide an additional conduit for lessons learned from institutional training, such as the Robin Sage exercise and the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course. These lessons, along with the UA's daily interaction with students, will help ensure that the program remains an appropriate and vital asset. At the strategic level, the fusion cell shares information with the National Defense University, which serves as the interagency lessons-learned facilitator.

The sharing of information across the command is critical, and the UAs play a pivotal role in that process. In the past, UAs served solely as a means for gathering and centrally storing after-action reviews from the field. Collating information is essential; however, UAs now conduct detailed analysis of information and share lessons learned and analysis across the command on peer networks and within the LLWG.

At the same time, the UAs have evolved into a uniquely qualified group of analysts who provide responsive lessons-learned support to commanders for effective training, mission planning and operations. UAs now have the ability to receive after-action reviews, conduct detailed analysis on their application within the command, and present them for action. As an example of that utility, command planning groups have directed UAs to provide information on current and previous operations relevant to mission planning. Ultimately, the UAs' development from archival entities into ones that provide responsive lessons learned to commanders will ensure that operational and training experiences become lessons applied within the force.

- Contributed by Lee McKnight, USASOC Lessons Learned Fusion Cell.

MILWIKI PILOT PROGRAM ONGOING AT FORT LEAVENWORTH

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Combined Arms Center, at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., recently launched a 90-day pilot program that allows Soldiers and Army civilians to make real-time updates to Army tactics, techniques and procedures, or ATTPs, using Wiki.

Available 24/7 worldwide to all military and civilian personnel with an active AKO/DKO account and authorized access to for official use only level information, the Wiki portal is designed to act as a secure collaborative site where authorized contributors may apply their real-world experience and subject-matter expertise to keep Army doctrine current and relevant.

The Army Doctrine Web (https://wiki.kc.us.army.mil/wiki/Portal:Army_Doctrine) currently houses 26 ATTPs representing a number of Army schools and centers of excellence. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School selected ATTP 3-05.202, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations*; ATTP 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques and Procedures;* and ATTP 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, as the Army special-operations forces contributions to the pilot program. The documents were uploaded to the Army Doctrine Web in August and September.

Although all changes are reviewed by the proponent for validity, contributions are reflected immediately on the Web. In order to encourage proper use and conduct, all contributors are reminded of the Army Doctrine Portal rules of conduct:

• This is a professional forum.

• You have the opportunity to change, add to or delete the content of sections of the ATTPs (portions of the ATTPs may have been locked by the respective proponent for the publication).

• If you are unsure of your contribution, feel free to post it in the discussion tab so that the community can vet it before it gets posted.

• There are no anonymous postings. We will use your AKO profile if we have questions about any of your postings.

• With this Wiki program, you have the ability to contribute directly to Army doctrine. When you contribute, consider whether your tactics, techniques and procedures apply broadly, across all environments, or only in one specific set of conditions. Make sure you include the appropriate context.

• This is a self-policing site, so your fellow professionals can review any contributions and can further correct, edit or retract a contribution.

• Posts should be short and to-the-point.

• TTPs should be written in the common language of the profession, using doctrinally approved terms from FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, where appropriate. If current doctrinally approved terms do not cover an emerging concept, you can use a new term and define it within the section in which it is used.

• In order to ensure the consistency of language, the doctrinal proponent reserves the right to adjudicate any conflicts between postings and existing doctrine. — *Peter Campbell, Editorial Branch supervisor, Media Production Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS.*

Haas Takes Control of Special Operations Command Africa

U.S. Army Colonel (P) Christopher K. Haas assumed command of Special Operations Command Africa from Brigadier General Patrick M. Higgins during a change of command ceremony Aug. 24 at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.

Haas

Haas was formerly the Director of the U.S. Special Operations Command Legislative Affairs Office in Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of Duquesne University, where he was commissioned through the Army ROTC as a second lieutenant in Infantry.

"To all the members of SOCAFRICA; I am in awe of your accomplishments and your professionalism," said Haas, who counts among his awards three Defense Superior Service Medals and a Legion of Merit. "You all have my deepest respect, trust and confidence. I will, in the coming months, endeavor to earn yours."

Higgins served as SOCAFRICA's first commander and assumed command of the unit in August 2007 when it was just a transitional headquarters. He said he was extremely proud of the command he will leave behind to become the Director of Special Operations Directorate-Iraq, Multi-National Forces-Iraq.

"Together we built what I consider one of the finest teams I have ever been a part of — a staff of dedicated and talented people who believe in AFRICOM's mission and in an innovative approach to meet the daily challenges of that mission — a mission of peace, not war," Higgins said. "I have been proud to stand side-by-side with each and every one of you. The important work you do here is making a difference to our nation and to the prosperity, security and freedom of the African people."

As SOCAFRICA's commander, Haas exercises operational control of SOF within the command's area of responsibility, which includes 53 countries and more than 13 million square miles. The primary focus of the command is on SOF missions that develop African partner capacity, provide assistance and support theater security-cooperation objectives.

Haas is a 24-year Army veteran who has served in multiple special-operations assignments. He has held command positions as commander, 3rd Special Forces Group, and served two tours as commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan.

INTEGRATING THE RULE OF LAW WITH FID IN IRAQ

By Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Tanabe and Major Joseph N. Orenstein

Over the last several rotations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 5th Special Forces Group-Forward, or 5SFG-FWD, has focused on the mission of foreign internal defense, or FID. Specifically 5SFG-FWD has sought to develop sustainable capacity with our partnered Iraqi FID units: the Iraqi Special Operations Force, or ISOF; and the Ministry of Interior's Emergency Response Brigade, or ERB. Both of these organizations are national units with subordinate regional units that operate throughout Iraq. An integral aspect of the FID mission was to integrate the rule of law by developing and nesting a process that incorporated Iraqi criminal law within the targeting methodology.

In late 2007, the group operations officer and deputy operations officer realized that many of the detainees captured through combined operations by U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF, and their partnered Iraqi FID force were either being released or were pending release from the custody of coalition forces. The detainee releases were found to result from two factors: (1) detainee overcrowding at Camp Bucca and Camp Cropper; and (2) the "security detainee" status under the UN Security Council Resolution, or UNSCR, which placed many of the detainees technically outside Iraqi criminal-procedure law. Other influencing factors that led to concerns for future detainee cases were the negotiation of the pending security agreement between the U.S. and Iraq and the related large-scale release of "security detainees," as preparations were being made to transfer responsibilities for security to the Iraqi security forces.

Mission analysis, involving the group future-operations officer and the future-plans officer, along with the group judge advocate, led to a course-of-action brief to the group commander. The group commander determined that it was essential to develop a process that ensured that high-value individuals, or HVIs, remained in custody and were criminally prosecuted. At the time, detention authority was based on a set of security standards established by U.S. Central Command policy and the existing UNSCR. However, on the planning horizon were significant changes pending the approval of the security agreement between the U.S. and Iraq that would replace the UNSCR.

Based on that assessment and the group commander's guidance, the planners developed a process that would integrate the evidentiary standards of Iraqi criminal law into the 5SFG-FWD's detention procedures. That would, in turn, remove the HVIs from the "security detainee" classification and re-designate them as "criminal detainees" in pre-trial confinement, in accordance with Iraqi criminal-procedures law. The process would be effective and responsive only if it were nested within the targeting methodology being taught to the partnered Iraqi FID units, as well as in the group targeting cycle that supported the combined missions between U.S. SOF and their partnered Iraqi units. The process came to be referred to as the "rocket docket."

In theory, the rocket docket was an expedited process whereby HVIs would be assessed by the SF group, battalions, teams or detachments as to their national or regional significance, and those identified as HVIs would be flagged early in the targeting cycle. Once that determination was made, coordination began between the U.S. SOF element, its partnered FID unit and the group's liaison officer to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq-Karkh, or CCCI-K, which was responsible for conducting key leadership engagements with the Iraqi judiciary and worked with Task Force 134's CCCI-K prosecution cell.[1]

The primary effort was to coordinate the appearance of witnesses before an Iraqi investigative judge after the capture of the HVI but before the HVI's transfer to Camp Cropper. In some instances, it was necessary to provide logistical support to the investigative judge for his movement to the hearing location. This support was coordinated between the group's judge advocate and operations sergeant major. Time was of the essence in these operations, because the detention-operations policy at the time allowed coalition forces to hold detainees for only 14 days (or up to 21 days with an approved extension). Coordination of the movement of an investigative judge and multiple witnesses who have their own patterns of life can be resource-intensive and complicated when you are trying to arrange for hearings within a constrained timeline, but the long-term, capacity-building benefit outweighed these significant challenges.

In order to set the conditions

for the success of the rocket-docket process, it was essential to have a thorough understanding of the Iraqi criminal code and the Iraqi criminal-procedure code, so that we could nest their requirements within the targeting methodology. Another critical consideration was the need to identify and mitigate risks in order to avoid jeopardizing the operational tempo and the established rapport between the U.S. SOF element and the partnered Iraqi forces.

The Iraqi criminal-justice system is an inquisitorial system similar to the civil-code systems in France and Germany. That system is quite different from the adversarial criminal process used in the U.S. In the Iraqi system, the investigative judge is the key player in the determination of whether someone may be detained and referred to criminal trial. The most important type of evidence to an investigative judge is witness testimony. With this in mind, we determined that human intelligence would be the primary means by which we would be able to obtain detention orders and referrals-to-trial, which could be used to keep HVIs in custody pending criminal prosecution.

The use of Iraqi witnesses presented challenges in protecting the identities of sources and in maintaining the integrity of source networks. Maintaining rapport with the investigative judge by avoiding the presentation of weak testimony or unacceptable evidence was another concern. We had to achieve balance, for if we leaned too heavily in one direction, the process would falter and become unresponsive.

The rocket-docket planning team[2] determined that vetting the investigative judge was a critical element in achieving a balance between source protection and judicial rapport. On a larger scale, the process had to mitigate risk to sources of human intelligence, but at the same time, it had to avoid the appearance of being an illegitimate "star chamber" proceeding conducted behind closed doors and relying on secret information. The 5th Group judge advocate tasked his CCCI-K liaison officer to engage the available investigative judges and gather personal information that could be provided to the group intelligence officer, the regional operational control element and counterintelligence elements of our partnered FID units for vetting. The CCCI-K liaison officer then approached the judges who had been cleared by the vetting process to gauge their interest in participating in the rocket-docket process. Finally, the planning team selected an investigative judge and developed a proof-of-principle test for the rocket docket's concept of operation. The idea was to select a case of a mid-level HVI in which there was good source reporting and witnesses who were still available to testify but were not connected to a strategic-source network.

Soon a test case was found. A U.S. SOF element within Baghdad had identified a mid-level terrorist financier whose case had extensive reporting and five Iraqi witnesses available to testify before the investigative judge. The investigative hearing resulted in a referral-to-trial order under the Iraqi criminal code, Article 4-1, on terrorism charges. The timeline from initial capture of the target to the investigative hearing was 18 days. The success of the test led to the decision to make the rocket docket fully operational throughout the 5th SF Group area of operations, pursuant to a published fragmentary order.

Over the next six months, nearly 33 percent of all detainees captured by the 5th SF Group were in-processed into Camp Cropper as criminal detainees in a pretrial status. The detainees were being held in anticipation of criminal trials and not subject to the "security detainee" release and review boards. Furthermore, because they were in-processed as criminal detainees in a pretrial status, the follow-up requirements were minimal, which allowed the targeting methodology to continue on its normal cycle.

The most highly publicized rocket-docket operation was the capture and subsequent criminal prosecution of the kidnapper and murderer of Mosul Archbishop Paulos Faraj Rahho. Archbishop Rahho had been kidnapped and murdered on Feb. 29, 2008. The suspect, Ahmed Ali Ahmed (aka Abu Omar), was captured in early March 2008, during combined operations with U.S. SOF elements combat-advising the Ninewah special weapons and tactics team.

"In order to set the conditions for success of the rocket-docket process, it was essential to have a thorough understanding of the Iraqi criminal code."

An investigative judge was flown to Mosul to take testimony from Iraqi witnesses and review evidence discovered during the sensitive site exploitation. The suspect was then transferred to CCCI-K for his investigative hearing, which resulted in a referral-to-trial order on terrorism-related charges. The now criminal detainee was taken to Camp Cropper and processed for holding as a pretrial criminal detainee. He was held until early May 2008, when his case went to criminal trial at CCCI-K. A three-judge panel (two Shi'a and one Sunni) convicted Abu Omar and sentenced him to death. The success in this highly publicized case was a significant factor that led the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior to nationalize the Ninewah SWAT team and transform it into the 5th Emergency Response Unit, or ERU, under the Emergency Response Brigade. The

^ **ON GUARD** A U.S. Soldier watches detainees at Camp Cropper, Iraq. *U.S. Army photo.*

transformation ensured increased logistical and budgetary support for this partnered FID unit.

On Jan. 1, 2009, the security agreement between Iraq and the U.S. was signed. Under the terms of the agreement, with few exceptions, the detention of civilians must be based on a properly-issued Iraqi arrest warrants. An immediate review of the theater detainee release list newly created by Task Force 134 found none of the individuals previously detained under the rocket docket — all were either still in physical custody, based on their criminal-detainee status, or had had their sentences executed by the government of Iraq.

Based on the 5SFG-FWD's previous use of the rocket-docket system, it was already positioned to operate in a warrant-based targeting system. The 5SFG-FWD commander's guiding principle for warrant-based operations using the rocket docket was to limit tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs, to those that partnered FID units could employ unilaterally, without any technical or logistical assistance from U.S. SOF. The rocket-docket TTPs were further expanded, based on the experience of the 10th SF Group during its alternate rotation in the area of operations. One example of refining rocket-docket TTPs was limiting the cases that relied upon fingerprints or tests for explosive residue (X-Spray). These types of evidence are less persuasive to Iraqi judges. So fingerprints and X-Spray results were used to bolster cases against HVIs, but the principal type of evidence collected for prosecution was witness testimony. Collecting witness testimony was a practice that the Iraqi units used independently and successfully. In fact, the partnered Iraqi units eventually began to develop, operate, maintain and vet their own successful source networks.

In February 2009, a U.S. SOF element that had operated in Baghdad produced a white paper that detailed the rocket-docket concept and its successful TTPs. The unit shared the white paper with U.S. SOF elements throughout Iraq so that it could be incorporated into the training they conduct with partnered Iraqi units. The training plan envisioned an end state in which Iraqi units could use the warrant-based operational TTPs with limited U.S. SOF involvement (serving only as quality control in an overwatch role).

As the partnered Iraqi units began to seek warrants from investigative judges, U.S. SOF trainers could provide an added level of sophistication to the case preparation. For example, when a partnered Iraqi unit identified a traveling investigative judge, the CCCI-K liaison officer would give the U.S. SOF element information about the judge's personality and any particular mannerisms or characteristics that could be shared with the partnered Iraqi unit. The information would allow the partnered Iraqi unit to ensure that it was presenting the most effective information and witnesses in a setting that would meet the judge's standards. The partnered Iraqi unit would actually take ownership of all aspects of the case (e.g., logistics, food, lodging and office space for the judge). Over time, this practice allowed the Iraqi units to develop a rapport with the investigative judges and to foster a working relationship built upon mutual trust. As that relationship developed, U.S. SOF elements became simply observers.

Another successful practice employed by the U.S. SOF trainers was the after-action review, or AAR. In the JAG community, judges refer to the AAR process as "bridging the gap." Following the taking of witness testimony at the investigative hearing, the judge would meet with the Iraqi unit leadership to identify positive and negative aspects of the case. The investigative judge's willingness to discuss the procedural, substantive and logistical elements of the hearings was valuable for identifying areas that required improvement, as well as best and sustainable practices for the future.

An example of a post-security-agreement rocket-docket operation occurred in Mosul and Baqubah in May 2009. In that operation, the 7th ISOF Regional Commando Battalion and the 5th ERU requested a mobile judicial team to take testimony from witnesses. A large number of witnesses was scheduled to testify, so the U.S. SOF advisers made the necessary coordination for holding an extended set of hearings. During the entire time that the investigative judge was in Mosul, he was hosted by the reconnaissance commander of the 7th ISOF RCB. Over the course of two days, 13 witnesses testified against multiple terrorist networks operating in and around Mosul. During

^ **JUST THE FACTS** A U.S. Air Force JAG officer and an Iraqi investigator look over legal files in Baghdad, Iraq. The investigators collect evidence and witnesses for trials. *U.S. Army photo.*

an AAR following the Mosul hearings, the investigative judge explained that he did not believe the testimony of two witnesses because of inaccuracies and contradictions during follow-up questioning and because they failed to present four forms of identification. However, he was otherwise satisfied with the hearings, which resulted in the issuing of 86 arrest warrants.

The following day, the investigative judge heard from witnesses in Baqubah. Unfortunately, because of security concerns, the investigative judge was required to stay at the U.S. SOF compound. However, the deputy commander of the Baqubah ERU coordinated for the delivery of all food for the investigative judge, which gave the two men time to develop a good rapport. Over the course of the day, the Baqubah ERU presented seven witnesses testifying against terrorist networks operating throughout Diyala. Based on their testimony, the investigative judge found sufficient evidence to issue 43 arrest warrants.

That night, air assets were unable to transport the investigative judge back to Baghdad because of inclement weather, and the following day the weather remained poor. To keep the investigative judge from having to spend another day away from his office, the leader of the U.S. SOF element suggested that the commander of the Baqubah ERU offer to convoy the investigative judge back to Baghdad, which would provide an additional opportunity for building rapport and trust. The investigative judge accepted the offer and was safely transported back to Baghdad.

The following week, the Baqubah ERU received information from a human-intelligence source that led to the successful detention of nine warranted individuals. Once again, inclement weather prevented air movement of the detainees to CCCI-K for their investigative hearings. The commander of the Baqubah ERU, at the suggestion of the U.S. SOF element, requested authorization to convoy the detainees to Baghdad immediately

^ **FREE BIRD** The provincial director of police in Diayala talks with a detainee prior to the detainee's release from custody in Baqubah, Iraq. *U.S. Army photo.*

rather than wait for the weather to clear. The transfer was authorized and was achieved without incident.

The significance of this series of operations was that the Baqubah ERU had taken a greater amount of ownership of its mission than any partnered Iraqi unit to date. As a result of the U.S. SOF element's capacity-building, the Baqubah ERU had developed a source network, identified its targets, prepared its witnesses, presented the witnesses to an investigative judge, procured arrest warrants, planned and executed a successful operation that yielded nine criminal detainees, and transported the detainees to Baghdad for trial.

The operations of the Baqubah ERU were not merely moral victories. Over the next two weeks, the nine criminal detainees were brought to court for their investigative hearings. All of the cases were referred to trial on terrorism charges. News of those successes was passed on through the U.S. SOF element to higher headquarters, other partnered Iraqi units and the local Iraqi populace. The hope was that the Baqubah ERU might be nationalized into a regional ERU, which would allow it to maintain its capability and provide sustainable security in the area.

In the end, through a functional approach rather than a paradigm approach, the 5SFG-FWD, using the rocket docket, was able to develop a methodology for targeting and sustaining capacity in its partnered FID units that was nested within Iraqi criminal-procedures law. Through a functional approach, we integrated the rule of law into our FID mission without disrupting our operational tempo or mission accomplishment. ***SW***

NOTES

[1]Task Force 134 was the major subordinate command of Multi-National Force – Iraq that served as the command-and-control element for theater detention operations and assisted in the criminal prosecution of detainees under Iraqi law at the CCCI-K.

[2]The rocket-docket planning team included the deputy operations officer, the future operations officer, the future plans officer, the regional operational control element, and the group judge advocate.

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FITNESS of the Warrant Officer Force at 40

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jeffrey A. Pauch

Special Forces is a small community because of the low number of volunteers who are willing to raise their hand and commit to the job. The members of the SF Regiment joined the U.S. Army, attended airborne school and volunteered to attend SF training. After that, some of those Soldiers volunteered to become SF warrant officers. All the commitments they have made up to that point have one thing in common: As a condition for success, there is a need to meet physical requirements.

SF warrant officers have a unique challenge because of the longevity of their assignments at the tactical level. The average SF warrant officer has 10 to 12 years of military service and at least three years on an operational detachment before he volunteers to become a warrant, and afterward, he remains on a detachment for another four to five years.

The level of the focus group for this article is senior SF warrant officers, who average 11+ years in SF, multiple assignments, training deployments and exercises, and three to six campaign rotations in various areas of operations over the last eight years.

Challenges

Senior SF warrant officers working at the operational and strategic level are faced with complex problems in unique systems, long hours and high demands on their cognitive and behavioral functions. One's effectiveness as a leader is directly related to his level of fitness. The senior leader's effectiveness is not a measure solely of his capability to work long hours but also of his ability to promote the image of the SF Regiment. Serving as the continuity of the unit and the representative of the regiment, and working increasingly more often in joint, combined and interagency environments, the SF warrant officer needs to convey a positive image of the force. For senior SF warrant officers, physical fitness requires a higher level of dedication and motivation than at the detachment level, where Soldiers take physical training as a group, and the program is somewhat structured.

This article is intended to assist the senior warrant officer in understanding the need to maintain a healthy lifestyle, to identify challenges faced by warrant officers 40 and older, and to explain the benefits of a fitness program balanced with proper nutrition and clinical exams that can provide insight to one's overall health.

Averages

In order to establish a baseline average age and fitness level for the SF warrant-officer force, the author conducted a brief study of 75 chief warrant officers who have attended the SF War-

rant Officer Advanced Course during the last three years. The study showed that the average age is 40 and the average score on the Army Physical Fitness Test given during the first week of the course is 267. The average student height is 71 inches, and the average weight is 199 pounds. Although the average weight is two pounds over the established height/weight standard for 40-year-old men, the WOs' average body-fat percentage was 22, four points below the approved guideline in AR 600-9, *The Army Weight Control Program* (November 2006).

Army Physical Fitness Research Institute

Understanding body composition and fitness level is only the beginning of creating a healthy lifestyle. The U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Penn., conducts extensive studies and provides instruction for staff and students through a four-phase research program, the Executive Health and Fitness Assessment. The assessment identifies high-risk individuals who require referral to primary-care providers. The research at the War College is conducted by the Army Physical Fitness Research Institute, or APFRI, from which the majority of this article's information comes. The APFRI staff consists of health professionals and exercise physiologists dedicated to providing senior leaders with information on health and fitness that is up-to-date, relevant and responsive to their needs.

Factors

SF warrant officers over 40 face increased health risks because their duty assignments tend to be more sedentary than active. In general, men over 40 have an increased risk of cardiovascular disease, or CVD; increased blood pressure, or hypertension; elevated cholesterol levels; and possibly Type 2 diabetes. CVD accounts for one third of the illness suffered by men between 35 and 65, with one quarter of patients having fatal heart incidents.

Heart attacks result from a blockage in the coronary arteries. Blockages prevent oxygenated blood from reaching the heart, thereby depriving cells of required nutrients and gas exchange for the whole or a portion of the heart. "Other forms of CVD include strokes, high blood pressure, angina (chest pain), and rheumatic heart disease."[1] Many military men think that they do not have CVD, and that may be true; however, chances are that their lifestyle has contributing factors to a future heart-related incident.

Increased blood pressure is related to the health of the heart and the cardiovascular system as a whole. Contributing factors to high blood pressure include smoking tobacco, dipping tobacco, eating foods high in saturated fat and/or sodium, stress and lack of aerobic activity. High blood pressure can affect not only the heart but also the kidney function and vision.

Cholesterol levels are determined by two numbers. The high-density lipoproteins, or HDL, and the low-density lipoproteins, or LDL, are both fatty substances circulating in the blood. HDL is known as the "good" cholesterol, taking bad cholesterol in the blood to the liver where it can be processed and excreted from the body. LDL, the "bad" cholesterol, tries to stay in the blood and builds up in the arteries as plaque, a fatty substance lining the wall of the vessels and making it increasingly more difficult for blood to flow to the vital organs and the rest of the body.

Type 2 diabetes is the most common form of the disease. In Type 2 diabetes, the body either does not produce enough insulin or the cells ignore the insulin. Insulin is necessary for the body to be able to use glucose for energy. When we eat food, the body breaks down all the sugars and starches into glucose, the basic fuel for the body's cells. Insulin takes the sugar from the blood into the cells. When glucose builds up in the blood instead of going into the cells, it can cause two problems: the cells may be starved for energy or, over time, high blood-glucose levels may damage the eyes, kidneys, nerves or heart.[2] For up-to-date information on the recommended resting heart rate, blood pressure and glucose levels for their age group, Soldiers should consult their healthcare provider.

"Senior SF warrant officers working at the operational and strategic level are faced with complex problems in unique systems, long hours and high demands on their cognitive and behavioral functions. One's effectiveness as a leader is directly related to his level of fitness. The senior leader's effectiveness is not a measure solely of his capability to work long hours but also of his ability to promote the image of the SF Regiment."

Aerobic Activity

Despite the risk factors, Soldiers can improve their health with proper fitness and nutrition programs, including regular aerobic activity, strength training, flexibility routines and stress management.

Aerobic activity can consist of walking at a brisk pace, jogging, running, biking, cross-country skiing, swimming, rowing or kayaking. Pushing a shopping cart or stroller around a store, or walking the dog, unless the dog can maintain a continuous brisk rate, do not constitute aerobic activity. An effective program is one that gets your heart rate to between 70 and 90 percent

of the maximum heart rate, or MHR, for at least 30 minutes a day, five days a week. Running five days a week can have a negative impact on muscles and joints, so the program should be varied. Aerobic training sessions can consist of long distances at a slow rate or interval training that alternates in intensity during the workout session. In interval training, vary the activity's tempo by warming up for one-third of the session, challenging yourself continuously but manageably for one-third, then cooling down for the final third.

Strength Training

Strength training is a vital part of maintaining proper body composition through weight loss and developing and maintaining lean muscle mass. Weight training can be confusing for beginners trying to determine which muscles to exercise, how much weight to use, how many repetitions and sets of an exercise to perform and how long to rest between sets.

Conducting strength training of the same muscle groups two days in a row should be avoided, but weekly workout programs can contain three to five days of strength training intermixed with aerobic sessions. Some advanced programs are designed with five days of aerobic activity in the morning and strength training in the afternoon. Conducting workouts between three and five days a week will avoid the lean-muscle loss that can occur in as little as two weeks.

In strength training, a general rule is to do 8 to 10 repetitions with greater resistance if you are trying to build muscle and 12 to 15 with light-to-moderate resistance if you are trying to lose weight or develop endurance. The resistance — the weight — you use should allow you to complete the required repetitions with proper form and to produce moderate-to-complete muscle failure by the end of the repetitions. The number of sets can range from 2 to 5, not including warm-up sets, with rest periods of 30 seconds to two minutes, again depending on whether you are trying to lose weight or develop muscle mass. The longer you wait between sets, the more time your muscles have to recover.

Beginners should use weight machines before moving to free weights.

^ **DESK DUTY** Senior warrants working in Afghanistan often find themselves working long hours in unique situations that provide challenges to their physical fitness.

That will isolate and prepare the muscle group they are working on until they are ready for free weights, which involve the use of accessory muscles. For improvement on the APFT, do not rely solely on weights to substitute for the push-ups and other exercises of the test. The complex movements of the body cannot be replicated with any machine or free weights.

It will help you to reach your fitness goals if you change your strength training routines every 6 to 8 weeks in order to avoid program-conditioning plateaus. Information on recommended strength-training routines can be found in various Web sites, books and men's fitness magazines — just read through the entire routine before starting it, to ensure that the routine will meet your goals and that it maintains the principles of strength training: "overload, progression, specificity, regularity, recovery, balance and variety."[3] Always check with your doctor or health-care provider before starting a physical-conditioning program if you are in a high-risk group.

Flexibility

Flexibility is a component of a proper fitness program that is often overlooked: We run, we lift, we slap

ourselves on the back and hit the showers. Without flexibility training, we increase our chances for future injuries, loss of balance and possible falls that can result in bone fractures. Stretching should be incorporated into the fitness program before and after you run or lift weights, or twice a week as a 30-45 minute session. Stretching effectiveness is reached after a body warm-up with light jogging or 5 to 6 minutes of calisthenics.

Stretching movements extend the muscle to the end of the joint's range of movement and should be held for 15 to 30 seconds. Breathing is a key factor when stretching. Inhale during the movement and exhale during the hold of the stretch — that allows for maximum relaxation of the muscle group and a more effective stretch. Avoid ballistic or bouncing stretches for muscle groups until you have sufficiently stretched the muscle with static movements.

There are stretching exercises for all the muscles, from the neck to the foot, including the forearms, which will make push-ups a little easier. For strength, flexibility and core training, try yoga. The routines of yoga have been used by professional athletes for decades to increase their performance and reduce injuries.

Stress Management

Research has demonstrated a convincing link between depression, anxiety, anger and chronic stress and the development of CVD.[4] When stressed for long periods, the body releases a cortical steroid that results in belly fat, hypertension and increased levels of blood sugar. Stress management will curtail the body's natural response to its perception of stress over long periods of time. Controlling stress can be done by getting plenty of sleep, proper exercise, meditation, and/or breathing exercises, along with simplifying your lifestyle, reducing the number of extra tasks you take on in a day, and getting organized by prioritizing tasks.

Nutrition

When people stop exercising and don't watch what they eat, they can gain 5 to 10 pounds a year. Proper nutrition is the key to getting the results that you are working so hard for by running all those miles and lifting all that weight. Weight gain does not happen overnight, neither does weight loss. However, a proper nutritious meal plan, not a diet, can turn that all around. Meals centered on protein, with controlled amounts of carbohydrates, balanced with servings of fruits and vegetables, will help avoid the risk factors for CVD, hypertension, high cholesterol and type-2 diabetes.

Meal portions should consist of 3 to 4 ounces of lean protein, one-half cup of carbohydrates and a cup of vegetables, with skim milk or water to drink. Snacks between meals should be centered on a portion of protein and natural fibers, like walnuts or no-salt almonds. Fruits high in antioxidants, which include grapefruit, blueberries and pomegranates, are beneficial to the heart. Carbohydrates should consist of simple-sugar grains, such as brown rice and whole-wheat bread, that are easily digested over a longer period of time, providing a more stable level of sugar in the blood.

Things to be avoided are nondiet sodas, large amounts of alcohol, tobacco products and huge portions of food. If you drink a glass of water before you eat and include a salad with a sensible dressing with your dinner meal, you will feel full and save on calories. Men over 40 have a natural daily caloric requirement of 1,600 to 2,500 calories per day. If you want to lose weight, you need to eat, but reduce your caloric intake by 500 calories a day. A few more tips include packing your food at home, taking fruit for quick snacks, and eating another snack after dinner if your workday lasts longer than 15 to 18 hours.

What It All Means

Medical advances in monitoring the heart, blood pressure, bone density, cardiovascular capacity, glucose levels and prostate health all help you to stay healthy and perform your assigned duties. The Army requires an over-40 physical and recommends an annual prostate exam to watch for signs of a major health issue, prostate cancer. If you don't know what your body is headed for, how can you properly avoid it?

The information provided here is by no means a complete computation of what it takes to maintain a healthy lifestyle, but it can be the first step in getting to where you want to go. SF warrant officers continue to do great things all around the world. Making the change to a healthy lifestyle takes commitment until the process becomes second nature, but if there is anyone in the SF Regiment who can understand the word "commitment," the SF warrant can. We cannot allow the face and image of our corps and regiment to be that of a person who lacks pride in themself and the unit they represent to the point that they become grossly overweight and ineffective because of chronic health issues. Making the change to a better lifestyle can help ensure a long and prosperous life, aid in the achievement of challenging goals and help set the standard for senior enlisted Soldiers and officers with whom you work. You owe it to yourself, your family and the Army. ***SW***

Notes

[1] Army Physical Fitness Research Institute, "What's New, Support Cardiovascular Disease Awareness" (Carlisle, Penn.: U.S. Army War College, 2009) https://apfri.carlisle.army.mil/web/Publications/Feb%20Newsletter%202007.pdf.

[2] American Diabetes Association, "Type 2 Diabetes, Conditions, Treatments, Resources," http://www.diabetes.org/type-2-diabetes.jsp.

[3] U.S. Army, Field Manual 21-20, *Physical Fitness Training* (September 1992), 3-2.

[4] *APFRI Executive Health and Fitness Assessment Interpretation Guide* (Fourth Edition) (Carlisle, Penn.: U.S. Army War College, June 2007), 42-43.

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

ARMY EXECUTIVE IRREGULAR WARFARE CONFERENCE CHARTS ARMY'S PATH

By Janice Burton

The Army made a first step toward the establishment of a whole-of-government approach to ongoing military operations around the world as the JFK Special Warfare Center and School hosted the U.S. Army Executive Irregular Warfare Conference Aug. 10-14 at Fort Bragg, N.C. The conference brought together both conventional and special-operations forces, members of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development and members of academia.

Lieutenant General John Mulholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the host of the conference, noted that the conference brought together "luminaries and experts" in the IW field to work to put together a way ahead. Top military leaders in attendance were General George Casey, chief of staff of the Army; General James Mattis, commander of the Joint Forces Command; General Martin E. Dempsey, commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; and Admiral Eric Olson, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Civilian experts in attendance included Robert Kaplan, Dr. John Nagl and Ralph Peters.

Calling the current time an "era of persistent conflict," Casey said the aim of the conference was to put the current engagements in context. "We need to get our arms around the future security environment," he said.

Casey noted that people talk about the Army "turning its back" on IW after the war in Vietnam, adding that it was a change by design. He said that the move back to IW is also a conscious decision. "We have to be able to operate across the spectrum of conflict."

The Army, Casey explained, must be a versatile mix of flexible organizations to exist in an era of persistent conflict. "The character of conflict has changed," he said.

Casey asked the participants to look at several issues throughout the conference, with the first being the role of Special Forces in full-spectrum operations. He pointed to SF's successes in Iraq. "They were the experts," he said.

"Are we all going to become like Special Forces, or is Special Forces going to become like the rest of the Army? I hope not. Special Forces push the envelope," he said.

Casey said that there is a need for a center of excellence for IW. "I do believe we need a center of excellence for IW. If it's not here (Fort Bragg), I don't know where it would be," he said. "We need someone to continue to think about the challenge of IW and to continue to push the envelope not only for the Army, but for the rest of the U.S."

He asked that the attendees consider how the Army can train and develop leaders for full-spectrum ops, adding that the force has been wrestling with that question for a number of years.

Other questions Casey asked be considered are how to break the institutional chokehold on the development of plans, and finally, the role of conventional and special-operations forces in IW. Casey challenged the audience to think about the training being done at home station.

"We can't replicate what we are doing at the National Training Center, but we can integrate IW skills into training," he said.

Part of that training has to be a unique education program designed to create adaptable leaders. Casey noted that TRADOC, under the leadership of General Dempsey, is already looking at this issue — trying to create training plans to educate Soldiers for what they will need to do in the future. Part of the answer, Casey noted, is getting troops away from the force for training not only in military educational institutions but also in other government agencies and civilian centers of education.

"Are we all going to become like Special Forces, or is Special Forces going to become like the rest of the Army? I hope not. Special Forces push the envelope. I do believe we need a center of excellence for IW. If it's not here (Fort Bragg), I don't know where it could be. We need someone to continue to think about the challenge of IW and to continue to push the envelope not only for the Army, but for the rest of the U.S."

"We want folks to go to civilian institutions. We want you to work with other agencies. Go work on Capitol Hill, work with industry," he said. "This is a different Army than the Army I grew up with. We now have combat-seasoned leaders who need to take a knee, get out of the operational area and become broader."

Following a day of briefings by senior military and civilian leaders, attendees broke into six working groups designed to answer the questions posed by Casey. The groups were designed to be led by senior colonels; however, Lieutenant Colonel Chad Clark and Command Sergeant Major Ledford Stigall, both Special Forces Soldiers, were tapped to lead two of the working groups. Stigall, the only NCO in charge of a group, received high praise from Casey and Dempsey.

The six working groups were: The Whole of Army Approach, Individual and Small Unit Training, Intelligence Requirements, Personnel Management, Experimentation and Wargaming, and Leader Development and Education. Each group was asked to look at the current state of each area, define the required state, define gaps and shortfalls, come up with solutions to the shortfalls and define the way ahead, or the next steps, for the Army in creating a whole-of-government approach to IW.

The conclusions of the working groups are listed below:

Whole-of-Army Approach to IW

As defined by the working group, a balanced approach to IW integrates the collaborative efforts of all relevant U.S. Army capabilities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A whole-of-Army approach is vital for focusing resources, capabilities and activities that contribute to required joint capabilities in support of geographic combatant commands and country teams.

The required state calls for the Army as a whole to have visibility and understanding of IW requirements; to have a common operational picture that will give all access to required capabilities and capacities for the entire force structure; and to clearly communicate IW needs and capabilities with external partners and supported stakeholders. The Army must be postured to proactively shape joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational actions; and Army capabilities should be formed, but not defined by current operations.

The working group concluded that in order to establish a whole-of Army approach to IW, the Army must:

• Develop mechanisms for identifying and prioritizing demands.

• Conduct mission analyses of Department of Defense and joint policies (e.g., DODD 3000.07, CJCSI 3210.06) to refine the Army's roles, responsibilities and authorities in IW.

• Establish an IW center as a focal point and advocate (ACP DP140 – ongoing).

• Institutionalize required capabilities using the Army Campaign Plan, The Army Plan, Total Army Analysis and IW roadmaps to secure required resources.

• Review IW definition and doctrine to remove confusion and complexity.

• Establish an on-line forum.

Individual & Small Unit Training

The current state of training perceives major combat operations and IW as two separate training requirements that are task-based at the individual level and not outcome-based. The group noted that standards apply to the performance of tasks by the individual, rather than to developing key attributes of the training event.

The group concluded that the Army needs to standardize training, evaluations and assessment for the attributes required in full-spectrum operations — initiative, confidence, accountability and problem-solving. Individuals and small units must be able to understand, integrate and synchronize the roles of mission enablers, and all training must be full-spectrum and include IW.

The working group made four recommendations for the Army to follow in order to meet the required end state:

Recommendation 1: Determine and apply measures of confidence, initiative, problem-solving and accountability to all aspects of individual and collective training.

• Establish a working group of subject-matter experts, based upon IW-conference results, to refine the doctrine and training strategy for the Army.

• Establish a critical-task review board to review IW individual and collective tasks.

• Standardize and modify programs of instruction, including outcome-based IW training.

Recommendation 2: Integrate SMEs from the whole of government and all the services within the training base.

• Establish partnerships with other agencies, services and partner nations to increase participation in Army training venues and in reciprocal-training venues.

Recommendation 3: Increase proficiency to employ enablers at lower levels.

• Identify the relevant enablers.

Recommendation 4: Hold a follow-up meeting to continue to develop IW training requirements.

• Establish a standing working group to develop and track implementation within the Army.

^ **TOP GUN** Army Chief of Staff General George Casey addresses the attendees at the Army Executive Irregular Warfare Conference at Fort Bragg. *U.S. Army photo.*

Intelligence Requirements

In the area of intelligence, the group found that doctrine development is slow and cumbersome and does not keep pace with technology and lessons learned. IW doctrine is fragmented. There is no formal, consistent link between SOF and conventional forces. While intel-oriented training venues exist, they are not focused on training Soldiers in the complexities of IW support to campaigns. The materiel support is lacking, most visibly in the area of communications, and the procurement process is neither flexible nor agile. There are few incentives for Soldiers to become career cultural experts, or Lawrences, in an area, and it is difficult to recruit and hire the right personnel for the job.

^ **ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE** General James Mattis, commander of the Joint Forces Command, talks about a whole-of-government approach to tackling hybrid threats. *U.S. Army photo.*

In order to move toward a whole-of-Army approach, the intelligence community must have updated doctrine on basic intelligence principles, embracing a more open-source intelligence approach. There must be a great reach-back in the garrison organization. Training must be comprehensive in the areas of language and culture, and it must have varying levels of complexity. Soldiers must acquire expertise in social networking.

In the realm of personnel, the group noted that the Army must embrace and expand the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest Program, in order to match Soldiers' skill and experience at the unit level. In order to move in that direction, the group outlined the way ahead:

• Need a new philosophy for the way we think (approach the enemy).

• Need to become population-centric.

• Need joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multination, or JIIM, networking/operations.

• Need an extended time cycle.

• Need a unifying concept to define where to invest.

• Need a framework that assesses the required realignment of resources.

• Need a streamlined architecture for sharing common data.

Experimentation and Wargaming

The current state of Army experimentation and wargaming lacks a comprehensive and well-understood framework and processes for IW assessment. A modeling-and-simulation strategy exists, but it's not being followed. Current analysis and assessment relies heavily on assumptions and professional judgment, leaving decision-makers wrestling with questions on what aspects of IW should be addressed by analysis of full-spectrum operations. Leaders lack confidence in the current IW methods, models and tools, and there is a lack of full-spectrum, large-scale scenarios that incorporate hybrid threats.

In order to achieve the desired end state, the Army must:

• Fully implement the Army Modeling and Simulation Strategy.

• Aggressively pursue that strategy with sufficient resources in order to better capture data and understand the human social cultural behavior dynamics.

• Brief the Army Modeling and Simulation Office and the IW Senior Coordinating Group on the working group's recommendations.

Develop a plan to:

• Develop full-spectrum defense-planning scenarios with hybrid threats.

• Establish a code of best practices for assessment frameworks and metrics.

• Leverage and resource ongoing efforts to develop methods, models and tools.

Personnel Management

The personnel-management working group was one of the more robust groups, delving into all aspects of personnel management for the total force. It found the desired end state to include the establishment of an IW personnel proponent, the integration of civil-military activities across the IW spectrum and an increased capacity of regionally-focused and culturally-attuned personnel.

In order to attain that end state, the group recommended:

• Identify an IW personnel proponent.

• Explore the creation of an IW CMF/area of concern.

• Identify critical skills and functions.

• Establish a tiger team to address solutions to the identified gaps — tiger-team stakeholders.

Leader Development and Education

The current operations tempo precludes the development of a robust leader-development plan; however, for the Army to move forward, it needs to educate and train leaders who can operate with JIIM actors, leverage capabilities and achieve integrated civilian-military effects. Leaders need to learn to better integrate complementary capabilities and effects, while recognizing and adapting to hybrid threats.

The way ahead in the development of a flexible and agile force is:

• Institutionalize and incentivize partnerships and internships with interagency partners.

• Deliberately create incentives for addressing intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for self-improvement.

• Identify potential inconsistencies in personnel-management and leader-development guidance; i.e., developmental assignments. **SW**

Janice Burton is the associate editor of Special Warfare.

BASIC INSTINCT

MOVING COMBATIVES TRAINING FORWARD

By Sergeant First Class William C. Clark

From the Spartans to the Japanese Samurai to the Soldiers of the American Revolution, combatives training has helped produce more capable, confident Soldiers, and combatives remain crucial to the training and development of the successful warrior.

In ancient Sparta, combatives were instrumental in the training and development of the warrior school, the *agoge*, which children began at the age of 7. Children of the agoge were forced to fight using a style of wrestling and submission locks called *pankration*. They fought with spears, sticks and swords in brutal fashion, honing their warrior's confidence and producing an indomitable mindset that seared the tiny Greek state into the pages of history thousands of years ago.

In the modern vernacular, the word "spartan" is a synonym for austere, hard or strong. Spartan warriors and their exploits became legend, and their dedication to military excellence continues to be emulated by warriors around the world.

During the Shogunate period in Japan, the sons of the professional military class, or Samurai, were taught *bujitsu* (warrior arts) under vicious conditions that today would be considered child abuse. They learned hand-to-hand techniques based on the economy of motion, unmatched swordsmanship and archery skills that made the Samurai some of the most formidable warriors of all time. In addition to their warrior skills, the Samarai practiced *budo* (the warrior way), a belief system that gave them a calm and confidence in battle. Totally committed, they had an intense faith that their training and skills would not fail them.

The Spartans and the Samurai had an edge — it was their training, their commitment, and their faith in themselves and their doctrine. Simply put, they possessed a "warrior's mind."

In the 234-year history of the U.S. Army, hand-to-hand training has received varied attention, usually based on the degree of personal interest of those who had influence over training. Early in our military history, "hand fighting" was practiced by George Washington's forces at Valley Forge to supplement the Napoleonic warfare drills that Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben taught the Continental Army.

Throughout these early days of our military history, morale and competitiveness were fostered by boxing and wrestling contests, among other pastimes. But hand-to-hand, fencing and close-weapons training were not merely hobbies for Soldiers who fought using Napoleonic tactics — they were vital for survival. Cavalry charges and massed formations, paired with the use of fixed bayonets, direct-fire artillery and flintlock firearms, made hand-to-hand or edged-weapon conflict highly probable. It was crucial that the forces had training and experience in those areas, as well.

From the Pacific campaigns of World War II, the Korean War and the occupations that followed each, Soldiers and Marines returned with not only exposure to, but in some instances extensive training in, the martial arts. Judo was brought back to the U.S. in large volume first, followed closely by Okinawan- and Japanese-style karate.

After the Korean War, Soldiers and Marines brought back several Korean martial-arts styles later employed by the Republic of Korea's army in a combatives program fostered by General Choi Hong Hi. Hi supervised the publication of manuals and the implementation of the new program with an old name: tae kwon do. He had a manual sent to his friend in the U.S., Jhoon Ree, who began teaching and

promoting tae kwon do as a sport and as self-defense at his schools in Texas and other states.

During the Vietnam War and the Cold War era, the U.S. occupied bases in Thailand and throughout the Indochina region, including the Malay Archipelago, thereby exposing servicemen to muay thai kickboxing; kali/escrima, Philippine martial arts that emphasize stick and sword fighting; and silat, Malayan martial arts that use strikes, throws and bladed weapons. Muay thai kickboxing was particularly brutal. It includes the familiar techniques of Western boxing but also includes trips, the use of knees and elbows, and shin kicks, with bouts often ending in knockouts. This all-out type of fighting drew large crowds at stadiums and in small clubs. Demonstrations of weapons skill in the region featured weapons like escrima sticks and various edged weapons in blade-wielding dances. They featured common and concealable weapons used with grace and logical flow. Many servicemen found these displays to be efficient, captivating and exotic. During and after the war, returning Soldiers and immigrants from the region brought with them these styles of martial arts.

Overall, from the mid-1940s to the early 1990s, the practice of martial arts proliferated in the U.S. and around the world. Tae kwon do and judo became Olympic sports; schools sprang up across the country with instruction in styles from around the world. Today, there are thousands of schools teaching karate, aikido, ninjutsu and judo in small towns and big cities. Some credit for that boom can be given to Hollywood, which embraced Bruce Lee, David Carradine, Chuck Norris, Steven Seagal, Jean-Claude Van Damme and others in films that cast the actors as elite Soldiers, fighters and all-around heroes. Box-office receipts, along with enrollments in gymnasiums and martial arts studios, show that Americans aspire to be strong and confident like their heroes.

The perception that martial artists are all but invincible in a fight against dozens of opponents and that they can train themselves to superhuman levels of performance has become a popular idea in the U.S. After all, there was no real forum for disproving the notion that a martial artist could knock a man out by accurately applying nerve pressure, or that Joe Blow kun do was the ultimate martial art, whose practitioners could rip out your still-beating heart.

Boxing, kickboxing and muay thai kickboxing follow a strict set of rules, including referees for enforcing Marquis of Queensbury-style fight formats. There was no way to prove which style was the best, most deadly or most efficient. That is, not until 1993 and the debut of the Ultimate Fighting Championship and a man of diminutive stature named Royce Gracie. The original UFC showcased real one-on-one arena fights with limited rules. Gracie demonstrated that the combatant who exhibited superior technique and confidence, not necessarily brute force, was most likely to prevail.

The years since the UFC first aired have shed light on the realistic application of martial skills in hand-to-hand contests. Gracie's many fights and wins against bigger, stronger opponents who were skilled in styles that did not allow for realistic training opened people's eyes and made them reconsider their training practices. Today, many have embraced the "new" mixed martial arts, or MMA, approach to training first made popular in the U.S. by Bruce Lee in the 1960s. MMA requires that training be well-rounded, focusing on skills from multiple disciplines of combat-like grappling, striking, trapping, in-fighting, takedowns and takedown defense. It favors live-contact sparring and drills over rigid forms and traditional ceremonies, more like training under a high-school wrestling coach than under Mr. Miyagi from *The Karate Kid*.

Over the last 15 years, the Army and the Marine Corps have spent more time on the subject of combatives than they did during the previous 219 years. The main reason is that everyone else in the world does, too. MMA is the fastest-growing sport in the world: UFC events, when televised, are outwatched in the U.S. only by the NFL. Other professional sporting events such as basketball, NASCAR, baseball and hockey all receive much lower ratings when they are telecast in competition with UFC events.

UFC events routinely break box-office records, and they have taken place in many states, as well as in England, Ireland and Germany. Further, MMA events hosted in Japan have packed more than 93,000 people in arenas. All this focus and popularity is due to the simple fact that Royce Gracie put himself on the line in an arena. Sharing the same edge that the Spartans and the Samurai did, he won, again and again, just as his family had been doing for more than 80 years. He wasn't even the best fighter among his brothers! He was successful because he and his brothers trained realistically; they relied on techniques that worked in routine live sparring. Royce and his brothers had developed a true warrior's mindset. Live fighting was the norm for Royce; it was not the norm for his opponents. Royce had logged thousands of hours participating in live sparring, but his opponents' hours of live, full-contact sparring could be counted on a single hand. His family had perfected transitions between techniques, just as Soldiers perfect their transition from their primary weapon to their secondary weapon on the range. To Gracie, fighting was like clockwork. America was watching.

In 1995, Gracie was a cult hero, undefeated in the UFC. At that time, within most Army units, there was a lack of confidence in the techniques the Army taught, in the light of these MMA contests. The Army lacked quality control of its instructors, there were no program supervisors and, most importantly, there was no sustainable, train-the-trainer instructor-certification program. As it always had been, training was driven from the bottom, by an interested, mixed bag of trainers. The situation led the commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion to reinvigorate the martial-arts training within his command. The Modern Army Combatives Program, or MACP, was the result.

Those tasked with developing and implementing the MACP encountered serious issues: Most of the Rangers within the battalion seemed to feel that the techniques taught in FM 21-150, *Combatives* (September 1992), were unrealistic or simply wouldn't work. The fact was that in accordance with FM 21-150, combatives were rarely taught outside basic training. The reason most often cited for that lack of training was that units with limited training time, whose battle focus was on "real" warrior skills, such as shooting, road-marching and common-core tasks at skill levels 1-3, could not waste their time with combatives. Given the vague combatives curriculum and a field manual that had not been significantly altered since the 1960s, it would have been hard to disagree.

The new MACP incorporated techniques brought together from multiple disciplines and training input from well-known martial artists such as Gracie; J. Robinson, head coach of the Minnesota wrestling program and former Iowa head coach; and muay

^ **SMACK DOWN** Ruben Arriaga of Fort Campbell's 5th Special Forces Group All-Army Combatives Team scores a technical knockout over his opponent to win third place in the light heavyweight division at the 2008 U.S. Army Combatives Tournament, Oct. 5, 2008, in the Sergeant First Class Paul Ray Smith Physical Fitness Center at Fort Benning, Ga. *U.S. Army photo.*

thai kickboxing coaches Manu Ntoh, David Rogers and Greg Nelson. MACP included training with edged and impact weapons derived from escrima, kali and silat. Combatives training had now been standardized, revamped and made realistic. Live sparring and training was possible without the fear of excessive serious injury that came from a lack of qualified supervision. The MACP is now producing a trained and competent instructor cadre, which is the core of any workable training program. MACP is part of the answer to a serious training problem within the Army, but it is a baseline, not a catch-all.

Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman's book *On Killing* discusses the evolution of combat training and cites examples of the compulsion of modern Soldiers, predominantly from the U.S., to hesitate when faced with the opportunity to kill the enemy. Grossman cites some specific examples: "During World War II, as many as 80 percent of riflemen chose not to fire their weapons at an exposed enemy, even if it meant that they might be killed. Many chose instead to fire their weapons in the air, to posture by mimicking the actions of war, or to busy themselves with supplies at the moment of battle." Grossman cites a survey of muskets recovered after the battle of Gettysburg that indicated nearly 90 percent of those weapons had not been fired.

In response to that kind of information, psychologists and behavioral scientists have helped modify the way we train as Soldiers. Computerized, pop-up ranges are now used to help condition Soldiers' response to fire on an enemy. Advanced technologies have been incorporated in ranges like the Zussman Village, near Fort Knox, Ky. That range has the realistic sights, sounds and smells of war. Rocket-propelled grenades shoot across the road with a whistle and explode in a shower of sparks, and scenario-based role players are armed with immediate-feedback weapons, such as paintball guns or sim-munitions. That realism in training is the concept of "stress inoculation."

Similarly, MACP includes sustained physical contact. These live-sparring drills prepare Soldiers the same way that pop-up ranges do. When the real stress-inducing situation is presented, the Soldier is armed not with some half-forgotten techniques once glossed over by an instructor but with a system that has been reinforced

through repetition. He has been in that stressful position many times and is more comfortable in it. When incoming students at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy are asked, "How many of you have ever been punched in the face in a real fight? Go ahead, count grade school," more than 70 percent of the students' hands invariably go up. The follow up question is, "Of those who raised your hands, how many have more than five minutes of actual fight time over the course of your life?" Half the hands go down. "Ten minutes?" With few exceptions, most all of the hands go down.

MACP training incorporates many fundamental aspects of fighting into a standardized format and has been made doctrine by the U.S Army Infantry School. MACP Level III and VI certification is issued by the U.S Army Combatives School at Fort Benning, Ga., or through mobile training teams from the school. Attendance at the school is scheduled through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, and certification is recognized in a Soldier's records.

The program has been embraced across the Army; it even provides a competitive venue in the U.S. Army Combatives Tournament, held every fall at Fort Benning. Competition has been purposefully engineered into MACP; it allows Soldiers to test the viability of techniques against an opponent who gives no quarter. Fighting exposes people who are new to it (and if you've done it for a total of 10 minutes or less, you're new to it) to a unique aerobic/anaerobic experience and quite a bit of stress. It leaves the majority of combatants almost completely exhausted after only a minute, regardless of how much weight they can lift or how fast or how far they can run.

Competition introduces unique stressors like performance anxiety, self-doubt and fear into the equation. Of course it isn't war, but it's as close as you can get without biting off ears or poking out eyes. When it comes to this type of training, egos should be checked at the door, for the betterment of the force. The U.S. Army Combatives Tournament and smaller unit tournaments like it foster general interest, as well as unit and individual pride. Bragging rights go to the command that produces champion 10K racers and touch-football or softball teams, but when it comes to the business of warfare, you'd rather have the guys who can beat the crap out of the softball team.

Unfortunately, within Special Forces, the flavor-of-the-week approach to combatives training is still alive and well. Groups award contracts for teaching combatives to local providers who may never have worn full kit in their life. Combatives contracts are sometimes diluted by pairing combatives with other training, such as rock climbing or specialized fitness programs. That causes the contract arbitrator to look at things like snazzy facilities rather than at the qualifications of the combatives provider and their program of instruction.

Within the SF Qualification Course, committees and detachments include combatives training, but what is the training standard? By what point in the SFQC should a new candidate be qualified at MACP Level I? If candidates are exposed to the MACP Level I curriculum, does their next exposure pick up where the previous committee left off? Do they reiterate and cement the previous techniques, skip way ahead to Level II or start on a totally different training path, such as Israeli Krav Maga pistol-disarming techniques, because that committee's combatives guy likes Krav Maga?

The SWCS NCO Academy has incorporated MACP training, and so has the Special Warfare Medical Training Group, but are their programs sustainable at their current level, or are they functioning only because of the cadre members who happen to be there? We should apply a standard of implementation that quantifies levels of exposure to the MACP curriculum in sequence.

In regard to combatives, SF lacks a standard for task-specific training, or TST. Depending on the group to which they are assigned, Soldiers will become familiar with different subject-matter experts and different takes on TST. Things like cuffing techniques, vehicle-extraction techniques, weapons retention and recovery, fighting in kit, and restraining compliant and noncompliant subjects may or may not be taught, and they certainly are not standardized. Will TST be addressed in the group's Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course, if they get it before they deploy, or by the group's combatives committee, if it has one?

By the time a Soldier arrives at his group, he should have been at least briefly exposed to TST. There is no cure-all when it comes to the fluidity of combat; still, we can establish a baseline to give SF Soldiers a standard on which to base their TST. MACP is designed to give the regular Army Soldier a base from which to work; it is not an end state. Infantry Soldiers don't carry secondary weapons or operate in one- or two-man elements in semipermissive environments, as SF Soldiers are so often called upon to do. It is only logical that we should develop TST for the SF operational environment, to be used in accordance with their unit's tactics, techniques and procedures.

Such a program is already in existence; it is called the Special Operations Combatives Program, or SOCP. Greg Thompson, Royce Gracie's senior black belt, a contributor to MACP's development, and a combatives teacher to many elite special-operations units, developed his TST-based instruction based on nearly 10 years of after-action reviews. SOCP complements the MACP; it addresses SF-centric tasks not covered in the MACP. It is being implemented by some advanced-skills committees at SWCS and ideally will become the baseline annex to MACP.

The Spartan warrior was supremely confident in a fight — any fight — whether using a sword, spear, dagger or fist. He had that confidence because he had been there a thousand times before; he had felt the knee of an opponent pin his neck to the ground and knew from experience that if he only relaxed, concentrated on breathing, turned his chin to the side and lifted the opponents ankle he would easily free his neck.

The Samurai was able to manage his fear when confronted by more than one armed opponent because he accepted the fact that he would be cut as inevitable, he had trained for it a thousand times, and he remembered the bruises he had suffered from the wooden training swords. Without hesitation, he moved forward — whether he won or lost, it wouldn't be because he wasn't prepared.

When we standardize combatives programs and integrate them into the curriculum of the SFQC, we will do a major service for the Soldiers of Special Forces. Let no soul cry out, "Had I the training ..." SW

Sergeant First Class William C. Clark is an SF weapons sergeant assigned to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy. He was previously assigned to the 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group.

Professional Development

NEW SKILL IDENTIFIERS FOR LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

The Army deputy chief of staff G1 has approved personnel development skill identifier, or PDSI, codes to be used for identifying Soldiers who have advanced language skills.

The codes will be used for 18A (Special Forces), 37A (Psychological Operations) and 38A (Civil Affairs) officers; Special Forces warrant officers; and enlisted Soldiers in career-management fields 18 (SF), 37 (PSYOP) and 38 (CA). Soldiers in a nondeployable status will not be authorized award of the PDSI.

To qualify for PDSI D5E (intermediate-level language skills), Soldiers must maintain a minimum score of 2/2 (listening and speaking) on the Oral Proficiency Interview, as documented on a current DA Form 330, Language Proficiency Questionnaire, in the target language.

To qualify for PDSI D5F (advanced-level language skills), Soldiers must maintain a minimum score of 3/3 (listening and reading) on the Defense Language Proficiency Test and 3/3 (listening and speaking) on the Oral Proficiency Interview, as documented on a current DA Form 330, in the target language.

To request that their Soldiers be granted the new PDSIs, units must submit their requests to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command; Attn: AOOP-TID; 2929 Desert Storm Drive (Stop A); Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9110. For additional information, telephone DSN 239-1098 or commercial (910) 432-1098.

NEW EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES AWAIT ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOLDIERS

The selection board for the Naval Postgraduate School, or NPS, convened in August to select the best-qualified Soldiers to attend NPS beginning in either January or June 2010.

The selection board for the Interagency Studies Program, or ISP, will be held in January. The board will consider the applications of Soldiers scheduled to begin Intermediate Level Education, or ILE, in the summer of 2010. ISP runs the duration of ILE with the addition of a summer session.

The goal is to have in place in fiscal year 2010 a single board to select Soldiers applying for NPS, ISP and warrant-officer ILE attendance. The board will select officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs to begin NPS in either January or June 2011. 2010 will mark the first time that senior NCOs have had the opportunity to apply for NPS. NCOs should be sure to check with their career manager in DSOP regarding the utilization assignments that are required of NPS graduates.

For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann, Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, at DSN 239-6922, commercial (910) 432-6922, or send e-mail to: goldmanj@soc.mil.

Warrant Officer

SWCS SEEKS SF WARRANT OFFICERS TO ATTEND ILE

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, or DSOP, is seeking qualified SF warrant officers to apply to fill five positions in the year-long Intermediate Level Education, or ILE, course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All five slots offer students the opportunity to obtain a master's degree.

The minimum requirements for application are:

- Have a bachelor's degree from a regionally accredited school.
- Have attained a cumulative grade-point average of 2.5 or higher.
- Be willing to accept a two- to three-year active-duty service obligation upon completion of the program.
- Agree to accept a follow-on assignment.
- Be a graduate of the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course.
- Be a CWO3 or a CWO4 with fewer than two years time in grade.

Applications are due to DSOP not later than Dec. 1. They should include the applicant's current officer record brief, college transcripts, copies of his last three officer evaluation reports and a letter of recommendation from the first O6 in his chain of command.

For additional information, telephone CWO5 Samuel Doyle at DSN 239-1879, commercial (910) 432-1879, or send e-mail to: doyles@soc.mil.

SF NCOS CAN APPLY FOR WARRANT-OFFICER TRAINING

Special Forces NCOs in the active and reserve components who seek new opportunities with additional responsibilities can apply to become SF warrant officers. As growth in the force continues, SF warrant-officer-inventory requirements remain high. A critical skills accession bonus, or CSAB, is still available to Soldiers who complete the SF Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course, or SFWOTTCC, and are awarded the 180A MOS. For active-duty soldiers, the CSAB is $20,000; for National Guard Soldiers, it is $10,000.

To be eligible to apply for SFWOTTCC, NCOs must meet the following prerequisites:

1. Be a U.S. citizen (nonwaiverable).
2. Have a GT score of 110 or higher (nonwaiverable).
3. Be a high school graduate or have a GED (nonwaiverable).
4. Possess a secret security clearance (nonwaiverable).
5. Pass the three-event Army Physical Fitness Test in accordance with FM 21-20 and meet the height and weight standards in accordance with AR 600-9.
6. Have at least 12 months remaining on the current enlistment contract.
7. Hold the grade of staff sergeant or higher.
8. Hold an 18-series MOS.
9. Be no older than 46.
10. Have at least 36 months documented experience on an SF operational detachment-alpha.
11. Attain a minimum score of 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery or have a current Defense Language Proficiency Test score of 1/1 or higher (validated on DA Form 330).
12. Be medically fit for SF duty and able to meet the physical standards for appointment.
13. Have letters of recommendation from current company, battalion and group commanders, and from the unit's senior SF warrant officer. Applications from NCOs in the active component must include a letter of endorsement from the commanding general and the command chief warrant officer of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command.

Applicants may request waivers for all but the first four prerequisites. The commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has the final authority for waiver requests.

For additional information, visit the following Web sites: www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant or http://www.1800goguard.com/warrantofficer/warrant.html. Soldiers may also request assistance from the senior warrant officer in their unit or from CWO3 Bobby Craig in the Directorate of Special Operations Proponency. Telephone CWO3 Craig at DSN 239-7597, commercial (910) 432-7597, or send e-mail to: craigb@soc.mil.

WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU...

The *Special Warfare* staff needs your help to make this the best publication it can be. Drop us a line and let us know your ideas and opinions about the new concept and design of the magazine.

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Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Articles dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security through the author's chain of command.

HORSE SOLDIERS:

THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF A BAND OF U.S. SOLDIERS WHO RODE TO VICTORY IN AFGHANISTAN



DETAILS

by Doug Stanton
New York:
Scribner, 2009.
ISBN: 978-1416580515 (Hardcover)
416 pages. $28.

Reviewed by:
Dr. Alfred Paddock
Colonel, U.S. Army (ret.)
Madison, Ala.

After the Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attack on the towers of the World Trade Center, the United States responded by sending personnel from the CIA and Army Special Forces as the lead elements for war in Afghanistan. Their mission: to link up with forces from the Northern Alliance and assist them in destroying the Taliban with the help of American airpower.

Once the Special Forces infiltrated over the mountains into Afghanistan via harrowing helicopter insertions, they linked up with CIA operatives who provided the initial coordination with Northern Alliance commanders. To their surprise, the SF Soldiers were forced to use horses for their operations — an unusual requirement for which they had not prepared. Nevertheless, they did so, and all of the U.S. military and CIA personnel involved demonstrated great courage and flexibility in accomplishing their mission while operating in dangerously harsh weather and mountainous terrain.

The durability and versatility of the basic SF operational detachment was on display when they were often split into smaller cells to cover a larger area of operations. The expertise of SF medics was also demonstrated when one amputated the leg of a Northern Alliance soldier with the serrated, four-inch blade of a Leatherman tool.

Drawing on approximately 100 interviews, as well as on written sources, the author tells the story of this operation in a vivid manner. He explains well the precise coordination required with Air Force aircraft in order to target the Taliban with bombs and missiles. Without that coordination, the Northern Alliance could not have prevailed. The desperate battle at the Qala-i-Janghi fortress, where 600 Taliban soldiers escaped and broke into an extensive cache of weaponry, is particularly well-described.

This reviewer, however, has a number of concerns with this supposedly nonfiction book. First, the author's treatment of early SF history is inadequate and inaccurate. Indeed, there are only two paragraphs devoted to the subject. Apparently the author failed to consult some of the sources listed in his bibliography. As an example, "The unit itself wasn't officially formed until 1952, as the First Special Forces Group." The first unit, formed in 1952, was the 10th SF Group — the 1st SF Group was not formed until later.

In addition, the author cites exploits of the 1st Special Service Force as the forerunner to the original mission of Special Forces: "Relishing their lethal craft of stealth and surprise, these World War II soldiers even nicknamed themselves the 'Devil's Brigade.'" The 1st SSF, while included in the SF lineage, was a commando-type organization conducting operations similar to those of the U.S. Army Rangers. The true forerunners of the 10th SF Group, with its original mission of unconventional warfare — organizing and directing the activities of resistance forces — were the Jedburghs and Operational Groups of the OSS, particularly the latter. The OGs' 15-man organization and individual personnel skills were quite similar to those found in the original SF operational detachment in 1952.

Two other historical missteps should be noted. "They [CIA paramilitary officers] were the heirs of the former Special Operations Group (SOG) developed during the Vietnam War. SOG itself was an outgrowth of the OSS, whose spies operated behind enemy lines during World War II, fighting with underground resistance groups." Wrong … and wrong. The correct title of the SOG developed during Vietnam was the "Studies and Observation Group." And the latter did not evolve from the OSS's World War II unconventional-

warfare operations: It had its own unique history, organization and mission.

The reconnaissance elements of SOG consisted primarily of six- and 12-man teams, each with two or three SF NCOs. They were backed up with indigenous reaction companies led by SF personnel. Helicopters "inserted" these teams into Laos and Cambodia and "extracted" them after they completed their missions — or earlier if they were detected by the North Vietnamese army. These reconnaissance teams did not fight with "underground resistance groups." Indeed, SOG's efforts to develop resistance movements failed.

A particularly worrisome claim by the author is this: "During that war [Vietnam], the men of the Fifth Group [5th SF Group] grew their hair, slept in hammocks, took native women as girlfriends, and lived and fought in the jungle far beyond the reach of anyone's official control. *They also committed some of the conflict's worst atrocities.*" [Reviewer's italics.]

The latter assertion is unsubstantiated and outrageous. During this reviewer's three tours with SF in Laos and Vietnam — including one with SOG — I saw no atrocities committed by our Soldiers nor heard of any. Neither am I aware of documentary evidence supporting that accusation, and Stanton does not cite any. In fact, the book does not contain a single footnote or endnote, and an index — usually expected in nonfiction works — is not provided.

With regard to the author's other claims: These, again, are unsubstantiated generalizations. Some SF operational detachments wore the dress of those indigenous minority groups with whom they were working if they thought that would help them accomplish their mission. Most did not. And a firm rule with most operational detachments was no fraternization with the native women, which would have undermined relationships with their indigenous force and with local officials.

Another weakness is the author's liberal use of precise dialogue among the principal characters. The antennae of historians arise when they see this. They know that people cannot remember exactly what was said by them or others weeks, months or years earlier. That's why memoirs with extensive dialogue are read with large doses of salt. Nonetheless, fully one half of the book's 360 pages contains spoken dialogue and, in many cases, extensive conversations. The author says that this dialogue is drawn from the "thoughts and words" of his "primary interviews" with both American and indigenous Afghan personnel. That's not good enough for nonfiction work.

Finally, the author's integration into his story of John Walker Lindh — the American who joined al-Qaeda and was captured during the battle at the Qala-i-Janghi fortress — is awkward. Passages devoted to him are spread out no less than eight times in the book, some of which begin with statements like, "So said the voice of God," and end with, "So ends the voice of God." Apparently these passages are intended to show the evolution of Lindh's conversion to Islam, but they detract from the author's narrative. In reality, Lindh was but a minor character in the operation.

To sum up: *Horse Soldiers* is a good, gripping story about the accomplishments of a small force of courageous SF, CIA and Air Force personnel operating under incredibly demanding circumstances. It reads like a novel, which, indeed, contributes to its shortcomings. Much of the dialogue in the book could well be adopted for a movie screenplay — which is sure to come. But this "creative nonfiction," in addition to its historical inaccuracies, will dissuade most serious writers from citing it as a reference. ***SW***

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